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ABSTRACT Fault tree (FT) is a standardized notation for representing relationships between a system’s
reliability and the faults and/or the events associated with it. However, the existing FT fault models are only
capable of portraying permanent events in the system. This is a major hindrance since these models fail
to reflect accurately the other classes of faults, such as soft-faults, which are often temporary events that
usually disappear after the source of the interference is no longer present. This paper proposes a new fault
tree modeling paradigm, to capture the impact of temporal events in systems, called temporal dynamic fault
trees (TDFTs). TDFTs are utilized to model the characteristics and dependencies between different temporal
events, soft-faults, and permanent faults. These features are integrated into the proposed probabilistic models
of the temporal gates, which are modeled as priced-timed automata. This paper also proposes a new FT
analysis methodology, based on statistical model checking, designed to circumvent the state-explosion
problem that is inherent to other model-checking approaches. The proposed analysis is able to evaluate the
impact of temporal faults in systems, as well as to estimate the reliability and availability of the system over
extended periods of time. The experiments reported in this paper demonstrate the versatility and scalability of
the proposed approach. For instance, the results display the impact that temporal events may have in a digital
system. Our observations indicate that while regular soft-fault analyses tend to underestimate metrics such
as system reliability, TDFT analysis shows remarkable consistency with radiation testing, with differences
of under 2%, in the conducted analysis.
INDEX TERMS Fault tree, temporal events, radiation effects, single-event effects, statistical model-
checking, formal verification, system-level analysis, reliability, availability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a prominent fault diagnosis tech-
nique which has gained widespread acceptance for quan-
titative safety analysis. A fault tree consists of a diagram
which represents the failure of the top level event (TLE)
according to the failure of basic events based on the rela-
tionships between them. The objective of FTA is to provide
insightful information to designers regarding the reliability
of their systems by identifying the ways in which the system
is most likely to fail and thus showing the most efficient
ways to make the system safer. In the literature, FTs are often
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Engang Tian.
classified as either static or dynamic, based on the depen-
dency relationships between their respective components and
events. Examples of such dependencies can be event prior-
ity, sequence, spare behavior, etc. With the introduction of
dynamic gates [1]–[3], the relationship between the events
and components of a fault tree have changed into a dynamic
one, in which the outcome becomes dependent on the order
and the number of occurrences of basic events. Further devel-
opment into dynamic gates has led to the development of
fault trees with temporal requirements [4]–[6]. These fault
trees extend the dynamic gates to include tighter sequence
requirements for the events. However, the inclusion of tempo-
ral constrains in these approaches greatly limits the analysis
process. Traditionally, FTA is performed through simulation
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techniques [7], with tools based on techniques such asMonte-
Carlo simulation, time-sequential simulation, and discrete
event simulation [8], [9]. Analysis of large systems using
these techniques can often be overwhelming for the tool since
simulation-based analysis relies on input space sampling.
This means that unless all possible points are sampled, there
exists a possibility that an error is not detected by the analysis.
In recent years, many formal-based approaches for the
analysis of dynamic fault trees have emerged [7], [10]–[12].
These approaches (detailed in Section II) solve most of the
limitations of simulation techniques, achieving fast and effi-
cient FTA. However, current FTA approaches are not suit-
able for safety-critical analysis, since current FT modeling
techniques cannot capture sequences of actions (such as how
many times has event 1 occurred before event 2) and state his-
tory. Moreover, the binary representation (working or failed
state) of FTs is not adequate for systems with complex state-
spaces. For example, conventional fault tree events start as
inactive and may become active according to a probability
rate. Once an event becomes active, it will remain active
throughout the rest of the analysis. This behavior makes it
impossible to represent the occurrence of transient faults (i.e.,
faults that may appear or disappear from the system due
to the effects of external sources of interference, such as
radiation and heat) with existing fault-tree gates. This is due
to the absence of suitable fine-grain management of time in
conventional fault-tree structures [13].
This paper proposes themodeling of a new type of dynamic
fault trees with strict behavioral and temporal requirements,
hence referred to as Temporal Dynamic Fault Trees (TDFTs).
TDFTs are primarily targeted towards the analysis of tem-
poral events, such as radiation effects and heat. However,
the TDFT gates are flexible enough to be configured for
the analysis of most FT systems. The work in this paper
is distinct from the literature in the following ways: 1) The
proposed TDFTs are fault trees that capture temporal events,
state history and sequences of actions.We present and explain
the models of each TDFT gate, formulated as Priced-Timed
Automata (PTA). Thereafter, the complete model of the fault
tree is obtained through the parallel composition and syn-
chronization of the PTAs of all the required gates. 2) Each
of the gates in the fault tree is extended with a unique clock
which, along with a global system clock, enables precise time
tracking and management. This allows the proposed model to
accurately represent temporal faults, which are only active for
a certain amount of time [14]. It also enables the verification
of other temporal properties, such as the time required for a
specific event to manifest itself in the system. 3) An analy-
sis methodology is introduced, utilizing FT modularity and
sequential hypothesis testing in order to decrease time and
resource requirements while maintaining a high confidence
level for the results. This is combined with Statistical Model-
Checking (SMC), which provides statistical evidence for the
satisfaction or violation of the specification.
The aforementioned distinctions are demonstrated through
a comparative study, derived from verifying the estimated
system reliability obtained with conventional FTs versus the
new TDFT model. The proposed TDFT analysis is experi-
mentally evaluated on different scenarios in order to assess
its impact on the different types of fault tree gates and to
demonstrate its versatility. Finally, the proposedmethodology
is used to analyze the 7-stage integer pipeline of a Leon-
3 microprocessor. The obtained results are compared with
radiation and simulation tests from the literature [15]. Our
results demonstrate that regular FTA methods are inadequate
for the analysis of systems that are exposed to temporal faults.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section II,
some of the most relevant related works are briefly dis-
cussed. In Section III, we explain a few preliminary concepts
that are key to the development of this work. Section IV
introduces the proposed modeling of the TDFT gates, and
the SMC-based analysis methodology. In Section V, several
experiments are presented. These experiments have the goal
of demonstrating the main differences and advantages intro-
duced by the proposed methodology. Finally, in Section VI,
we draw some conclusions and discuss future works.
II. RELATED WORKS
FTA is an extremely important field of research. Being the
focus of many groups during the past decade, FTA has
evolved into one of the de facto techniques for early anal-
ysis of critical systems. Walker and Papadopoulos [6] first
suggested extending static FTs with Priority-AND, Priority-
OR, and Simultaneous-AND gates. These gates enable a fault
tree to enforce temporal dependencies between events. The
works in [11] and [12] present very robust formal approaches
to DFT analysis, based on Input/Output-Interactive Markov
Chains (I/O-IMCs) and stochastic model checking. The work
in those papers apply modularization approaches and compo-
sitional aggregation techniques, along with heavy reduction
algorithms, to formally analyze DFTs with model checking.
These techniques are built around theGalileo formalism [16],
which greatly limits the expressiveness of the analyzed
models. For example, neither approach is able to handle
self-repairable systems or any dependencies between gates or
events that have not been pre-programmed in the tools.
In recent years, several techniques have been proposed to
extend DFTs in ways to offer more flexible temporal depen-
dencies between its faults and events. Schilling [17] proposes
an extension of the conventional boolean FTA in order to
take sequence dependencies into account for qualitative and
probabilistic analyses without state-space transformations.
This allows modeling of sequences of events in all levels of
the fault tree. The analysis of uncertainty over time is the
focus in [18]. This work uses the Pandora tool and fuzzy
logic in order to predict and capture different sequences of
dependent dynamic events over time. The authors use their
method to combine probabilistic data and fuzzy set theory
with Pandora TFTs to enable dynamic analysis of complex
systems with limited or absent exact quantitative data. Peng
et al. [19] use a timed FT extension method applied to a
railway maintenance system in order to identify which faults
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are likely to occur first and, therefore, must be eliminated
more urgently. This method can estimate the time required
for railway maintenance and thereby improve maintenance
efficiency, and reduce risks.
All these techniques have in common the attempt to intro-
duce new dependencies between the different components
and events of dynamic fault trees. However, they lack the
expressiveness required for a robust analysis of the impact
of failures over time in a dynamic environment. The work
presented in this paper further augments fault trees, by com-
bining and extending dynamic, repairable and temporal fault
trees. The proposed fault tree models are able to capture the
randomness of fault testing, where a significant event (i.e.,
radiation) may occur non-deterministically. Furthermore, this
event may be permanent, intermittent, or it may be active for
a variable unknown amount of time.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. THE UPPAAL FORMALISM
UPPAAL is a toolbox for verification of real-time systems,
represented by a network of timed automata, extended with
integer variables, structured data types, and channel syn-
chronization. For the efficient analysis of probabilistic per-
formance properties, UPPAAL-SMC proposes to work with
Statistical Model Checking (SMC). SMC works by moni-
toring some simulations of the system, and then use sta-
tistical results (including sequential hypothesis testing or
Monte Carlo simulations) to decide whether the system sat-
isfies some property with a sufficient degree of confidence.
The modeling formalism of UPPAAL-SMC is based on
a stochastic interpretation and an extension of the Timed
Automata (TA) formalism used in the classical model check-
ing version of UPPAAL. For individual TA components,
the stochastic interpretation replaces the non-deterministic
choices between multiple transitions enabled by probabilistic
choices (that may or may not be user-defined). Similarly,
the nondeterministic choices of time delays are refined by
probability distributions, which at the component level are
given either uniform distributions in cases with time-bounded
delays or exponential distributions in cases of unbounded
delays [20].
An illustrative example of the UPPAAL formalism is given
by the PTA in Fig. 1. In this example and through the rest
of this paper, the weight annotations on locations and edges
are ignored and defaulted to ‘‘1’’. For Fig. 1, the delay distri-
bution determined by the upper and lower paths to the END
state is given by sums of uniform distributions, where X ≥ 2
(green label) is the guard of the transition (i.e., minimum
time), and X ≤ 4 (purple label) is the invariant distribution
(i.e., maximum time delay) of the transition. The stochastic
choice that determines which path will be taken is represented
by a forked transition, where each path is weighted accord-
ingly. In the example, the weights of each path are either 16 or
5
6 . Finally, an update may be performed during each transition
(blue labels). Therefore, the END location in the example is
reachable within the interval X = [4, 12].
FIGURE 1. Illustrative example of the UPPAAL formalism. Reproduced
from [20].
B. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
The fault tree analysis (FTA) method is a widely used
method for risk assessment, mainly in the area of avionics,
nuclear and chemical industries [1]. FTA follows a deductive
approach, which means that it starts from an undesirable
general event in order to find what circumstances may lead
to that event. In the context of FTA, the general event is
known as the top event, from which the fault tree branches
out vertically. The top event is defined as the failing point of
a system in operating conditions, whether those conditions
are considered normal or abnormal. Bottom events are occur-
rences that may lead to a component failure. As such, fault
tree models are characterized as graphical representations
of system failures, in terms of the system’s components.
Standard fault tree models are defined as combinatorial mod-
els, composed by static gates (mainly AND and OR gates)
and basic events. Combinatorial models can only handle
combinations of events and not the order of occurrence of
such events, thus are not able to represent complex systems
adequately. Dynamic fault trees (DFTs) extend standard fault
trees to allow the representation of more complex relation-
ships between basic events, such as functional dependencies,
priority, and order of occurrence.
IV. PROPOSED TDFT MODELING AND ANALYSIS
METHODOLOGY
A constant among existing FTA techniques is that the failure
of a basic event cannot be reverted (i.e., when a basic event
changes from the normal state to the fail state, it will remain
in the fail state forever) [21]. However, it has been noted in
the literature that basic events (i.e., events that may lead to the
failure of a component) are not always permanent. This fact
may heavily impact the results of fault analyses, especially in
systems exposed to nondeterministic environmental interfer-
ences, such as radiation, heat, and cosmic rays [22]–[24]. In a
previous work related to malfunction in pacemakers exposed
to ionizing radiation [25], we have demonstrated that these
radiation-inducedmalfunctions vary from a simple temporary
abnormality to complete system malfunction. The analyses
in [25] have indicated that a simple temporary bit-flip (which,
according to technical reports, is a common occurrence) may
cause the pacemaker to behave erroneously and even endan-
ger the life of a patient, in some cases.
The approach proposed in this paper overcomes this FTA
limitation by introducing the sensitivity to Temporal Basic
Events (TBE) to the fault tree gates (i.e, events that may
appear for a limited amount of time and then disappear if
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certain conditions are met). This enables a more accurate rep-
resentation of the environmental hazards that the system may
be exposed to, as well as for the tracking of faults which may
only manifest after thousands of cycles. Moreover, the pro-
posed models are capable of estimating the probability of
fault occurrence in systems exposed to temporal events of
varying duration.
In order to accurately model the fault dependencies in FTs,
our approach focuses on the formalization and modeling of
the probabilistic behavior of FT gates and events over time.
In this section, we show the modeling of temporal FT gates.
The general probabilistic model (automaton) of a FT gate is
expressed in Definition 1, adapted from [26].
Definition 1: Given a TDFT gate with a set of inputs Y
and an output Z, connected through a certain logic (such as
AND). The priced-timed automaton (PTA) of this gate can be
formally defined by a tuple A = (L,L0, χ,Act,P,L), where:
• L is a finite number of states.
• L0 is the initial state.
• χ is a finite set of clocks.
• Act is a finite set of actions over L.
• inv: L → ζ (Y ) is an invariant condition.
• P is a probabilistic transition function L × ζ (Y ) ×
Dist(2Y × L).
• L : L → 2AP is a labeling function assigning atomic
propositions to different states.
In the PTA defined above, a state (l, ν) ∈ L × Rχ≥0 is char-
acterized such that ν |H inv(l). In any state (l, ν), there is a
nondeterministic choice of either making a discrete transition
or letting time pass. A discrete transition can be made accord-
ing to any (l, g, p) ∈ P, with current state l being enabled
and zone g is satisfied by the current clock valuation ν. The
probability of moving to location l ′ and resetting all clocks
in Y to 0 is given by p(Y , l ′). The option of letting time pass
is available only if the invariant condition inv(l) is satisfied
while time elapses. Based on this definition, following we
explain in detail the proposed models for each TDFT gate.
A. PROPOSED PROBABILISTIC MODEL OF THE
TEMPORAL AND GATE
The probabilistic AND gate can be modeled as a temporal
gate because of the tight dependency between the output and
the inputs. As stated previously, the output is only generated
if all inputs occur. However, in the case of temporal faults,
input events need to happen at the same time to cause the
top level fault. For example, let us imagine a component
that fails in the presence of external heat (event x) AND
radiation (event y). Let us assume a scenario where external
heat is applied to the component for a certain amount of
time, after which the heat source is dissipated. Let us also
assume that the component has time to return to its regular
temperature before it is affected by external radiation. In this
case, since both events have happened at different points in
time, the requirements for component failure have not been
met.
FIGURE 2. Possible time window of a TAND output.
FIGURE 3. Example of a 2-Input leaf TAND gate.
In the proposed Temporal AND gate (TAND), each of the
basic events connected to the gate (X and Y in this example)
is tied to two attributes: the probability of the event occurring
and the duration of the event. The derivation of the TAND
rule is the following:
• Duration of the Event: It is assumed that the time
duration of a basic event is a random variable d selected
from an interval [0, . . . ,N ], where N ∈ R ≥ 0. After
an amount of time equal to d has passed, the basic
event ceases to exist in the system. The basic event
may re-occur according to the specified probability rate,
in which case the duration of the event may be different.
• Temporal Condition: As is the case with regular AND
gates, the output Z occurs only if all the inputs (X and
Y) occur. However, in the TAND gate, the output is only
generated when the duration of both inputs intersect.
In other words, both inputs must be active at the same
time. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the time interval in which
the output of the TAND gate may be generated is given
by:
Z = [d(X )min, d(X )max]
⋂
[d(Y )min, d(Y )max] (1)
where [d(X )min, d(X )max] and [d(Y )min, d(Y )max] are the
intervals in which events X and Y are active.
Fig. 3 shows a possible configuration of a Leaf TAND gate
with two inputs. A leaf gate (or bottom gate) is any gate that
has only basic events as inputs. An example of the possible
flow of a Leaf TAND gate with two inputs is as follows: State
S0 signifies the absence of faults. From there, the model can
transition through two symmetrical paths, where either event
may happen (i.e., x or y). Let us assume that event y occurs,
with probability py. In this case, the automaton moves to state
S2 and an update is performed by the function fail_y(), which
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FIGURE 4. Example of a simple fault tree.
FIGURE 5. Example of a 2-Input variant TAND gate.
resets the clock ty, determines the type of the event ky (ky==
0 signifies permanent fault, and ky == 1 signifies temporal
fault) and the maximum duration dy (in time units) of the
event. At this point, the automaton may return to state S0,
if ky == 1 and ty > dy, or it may proceed to state S3, with
probability px. If event x happens, the update fail_x() resets
clock tx and sets the value of kx, moving the automaton to
state S3. In this scenario, state S3may transition back to state
S2, if tx > dx and kx == 1, or it may transition to state
S4, broadcasting the output to the next gate. The same flow
applies to the top path of the automaton, when event x occurs
first.
To demonstrate how a FT is constructed with the proposed
automata, a simple example is given. Let us consider the
FT shown in Fig. 4. This FT has instances of two possible
configurations of the 2-Input TAND gate. Gate G2 is a leaf
TAND gate, since all of its inputs (x and y) are basic events.
The automaton of this gate flows as described above (Fig. 3),
producing output z. Let us now consider the gate G1 from
Fig. 4. Gate G1 is a variant of the leaf TAND gate, employed
in cases where one of the inputs of the gate is also the output
of another gate. The PTA of gate G1 is shown in Fig. 5.
Although gate G1 receives two inputs, w and z, the input z
is not an event, but rather the output of gate G2. Therefore,
gate G1 only receives one basic event as input (event w). The
flow of this automaton is the following: if w == 0 (i.e.,
event w is inactive), then w may happen with probability pw.
If event w happens, an update is performed by the function
fail_w(), which resets the clock tw, determines the type kw
and themaximumduration dw of eventw. The transition takes
the system to state S1. In state S1, the automaton will wait
for event z, which can be received through a synchronization
channel (channel a, in this example). If the system is in state
S1 and event z occurs (i.e., w == 1 and z == 1), then a
transition to state S2 takes place. Alternatively, if the system
FIGURE 6. Example of a 2-Input leaf TOR gate.
is in state S1 and the conditions kw== 1 (i.e., temporal fault)
and tw > dw (i.e., duration of the fault has expired) are met,
then the automaton goes back to state S0. When state S2 is
reached, the output of the gate is produced and communicated
to the next level of the FT via synchronization.
For conciseness, the discussions for the other gates will
focus on the leaf variant, since it displays the full functionality
of the gate and any required variants can be derived from
the leaf automaton. It must also be noted that all behavioral
patterns in the proposed timed automata are enforced with the
use of variables, either through guards, updates, synchroniza-
tion, or declarations, as exemplified above. Therefore, our
use of invariants in the models has the sole goal of allowing
the automaton to stay in any state indefinitely (i.e., invariant
set to 1). This is important, since the propagation delay of
the different inputs and gates throughout the fault tree is
unknown, especially when temporal and permanent faults
coexist in the same fault tree. Our experiments have shown
that wrong results and often verification errors are generated
when the automata are not allowed to hold a state indefinitely.
Similarly, our experiments have shown that the presence of
exponential exit rates is required in states where a clock is
manipulated. Our results have suggested that different values
of exponential exit rates have little impact on the verification,
as long as the value is consistent across all states. For this
reason, we have adopted the policy of setting the value of the
exponential exit rate to 1 in all states where it is required.
B. PROPOSED PROBABILISTIC MODEL OF THE
TEMPORAL OR GATE
TheOR gate is modeled as a temporal gate to better represent
the propagation delay that exists in real systems. The concept
of the proposed leaf Temporal OR (TOR), shown in Fig. 6,
is relatively simple, compared with other temporal gates:
assuming two temporal events (x and y) connected to a TOR
gate, where each event has a given probability of failure,
the occurrence of either event can generate an output in the
gate. However, due to the propagation delay of the modeled
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component (represented in Fig. 6 by the variablesmx andmy),
the output is not generated immediately. Therefore, the output
is only generated if the duration of the fault is longer than the
propagation delay, but smaller than the maximum duration
of the fault (variables dx and dy). The output of the gate is
communicated to the next layer of the FT through a synchro-
nization channel. The derivation of the TOR gate follows the
same rules as the TAND gate with regards to the duration of
the events. The temporal condition for this gate is given by
the equation:
Z = [(d(X )min, d(X )max] | [d(Y )min, d(Y )max] (2)
C. PROPOSED PROBABILISTIC MODEL OF THE
TEMPORAL FDEP GATE
The Functional Dependency (FDEP) gate is a dynamic gate
composed of a trigger input event and one or more dependent
basic events. If the trigger event occurs, the dependent events
automatically become unavailable. While the trigger event is
not in a failed state, the dependent events behave like regular
events (i.e., the dependent eventsmay fail independently from
the trigger event). The FDEP gate does not have a direct
output, however, a functional dependency may be attached
to any other gate in the fault tree, altering its behavior. The
behavior of the probabilistic FDEP assumes that a dependent
event y (such as the output of a gate) may happen with
probability py. However, if the trigger event x occurs, with
probability px, then event y is forced to happen as well.
The main issue with the regular modeling of the FDEP gate
is that the temporary occurrence of the trigger event com-
promises the system permanently. Let us take the example
of another electrical component. Let us consider the absence
of electricity to power up the component as the trigger event
and the failure of the component as the dependent event.
It may be the case that an external interference causes the
trigger event to occur, and therefore causes the component
to cease function. However, it may also be the case that
the trigger event disappears after a certain amount of time
(i.e., the power is restored). In this scenario, the system may
still function. The proposed Temporal FDEP (TFDEP) gate
(Fig. 7), models the behavior of a temporal trigger event x.
From state S0, event xmay occur with probability px, moving
the automaton to State S1. From state S1, the automaton may
go back to state S0 if tx > dx and kx == 1. In this case,
event x has no observable effect in the FT. Alternatively,
from state S1, the automaton may transition to state S2. This
transition sends a message (a!) which immediately causes all
other events that are associated to the TFDEP gate to fail.
Furthermore, from state S2, if the conditions tx > dx and kx
== 1 are satisfied, the automaton may move back to state S0.
When this transition takes place, another message is sent (b!),
which may override the effects of the first message (a!). The
temporal condition of an TFDEP dependency relationship is
given by the equation:
Z = [d(X )min, d(X )max] | [d(Y )min, d(Y )max]⋂[d(W )min, d(W )max] (3)
FIGURE 7. Example of a TFDEP gate.
FIGURE 8. Example of a 2-Input leaf TPAND gate.
where x is the trigger event, and y and w are two dependent
events.
D. PROPOSED PROBABILISTIC MODEL OF THE
TEMPORAL PAND GATE
As with the other FT gates, the PAND gate logic may also
be susceptible to temporary faults. To illustrate this, let us
consider the case of a backup system with two components in
a standby configuration, with component A being the primary
component and component B in standby. If component A
fails, then the electrical switch (which can also fail) activates
component B. Thus, the system will fail if component A fails
and the switch fails, or if component A fails then component
B fails subsequently. In this scenario, the events must occur
in the specified order. However, it is possible for the switch or
component B to fail without causing a system failure, if com-
ponentA never fails.Moreover, it is possible that the electrical
switch fails to switch due to a temporary fault. In this case,
the switching action might take place immediately after the
temporary fault exits the system.
In the proposed leaf variant of a Temporal PAND (TPAND)
gate with two inputs (Fig. 8), starting from state S0 and
assuming temporary event x is the primary event, a failure
only happens if event x fails before event y. The failure of
event x moves the automaton to state S1. From state S1,
event x may disappear from the system, returning to state S0,
or event y can happen, with probability py. The occurrence
of event y transitions the automaton to state S3, where event
y may disappear (returning to state S1) or the output may be
generated, which transitions the model to state S5. If event y
happens first, the model moves to state S2. From state S2,
event y may disappear, which causes a return to state S0,
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FIGURE 9. Example of a 2-of-3 leaf TComb gate.
or event x may occur, which causes a transition to state S4.
Finally, from state S4, if event y expires, the automatonmoves
to state S1. Alternatively, if event x expires, the automaton
moves back to state S2. As with the other gates, the output
of the TPAND is communicated to the next gate via synchro-
nization message (message a!, for example). The temporal
condition for the output of the TPAND gate is given by the
equation:
Z = [d(X )min, d(X )max]⋂[d(Y )min, d(Y )max]⇐⇒ (d(X )min ≤ d(Y )min) (4)
E. PROPOSED PROBABILISTIC MODEL OF THE
TEMPORAL COMB GATE
The Combinational gate (COMB) is a special case of the
AND gate. A COMB gate is composed by three or more
inputs and one output. The output occurs if M-of-N inputs
occur. In other words, the combination gate allows the
designer to specify the number of failures within a group
of inputs that is required for the top level event to occur.
By observing the examples given in the previous gates, espe-
cially the TAND and TPAND gates, it becomes clear how the
combinational gate can be augmented into Temporal Combi-
national (TCOMB) gate. A possible configuration of a leaf
2-of-3 model of the TCOMB gate is illustrated in Fig. 9.
As usual, state S0 of the automaton signifies no faults. From
state S0, three symmetrical paths may be taken, representing
the probabilities of failure of the three inputs of the gates. Let
us take event x as an example. From S0, event x may hap-
pen with probability px. This transition triggers the function
fail_x(). This function is responsible for a plethora of variable
updates. If the variable count is equal to zero, which is the
case since this is the first transition in the model, function
fail_x() will set the clock associated to state S1 (clk1) to
zero, the variable d_1 will be set to the maximum duration of
event x, and variable k1 will be set to the value of kx. Finally,
function fail_x() will increment the variable count and set
variable x to 1. After all these updates, the automaton is in
state S1. From this state, event x may expire if the conditions
clk1 > d1 and k1 == 1 are met. In this case, the function
timeout() takes place. If function timeout() occurs from state
S1 (i.e., count == 1), all variables are reset, returning the
automaton to state S0. Alternatively, from state S1, maintain-
ing the assumption that event x has already occurred, event y
FIGURE 10. Main steps of the proposed methodology.
can happen, with probability py, or event z can happen, with
probability pz. Let us assume that event z takes place. In this
case, the automaton calls the update function fail_z(). Since
variable count is equal to one, the update function will set the
clock clk2 to zero, the variable d_2 will be set to the value
of dz, and the value of k2 will be set to the value of kz. The
function also increments the variable count and sets variable
z to one. With the automaton in state S2 and variable count
equal to 2, the transition to state S3may happen, broadcasting
the output through channel a, in this example. However, from
state S2, if the conditions clk2 > d_2 and k2 == 1 are met,
the automaton may transition back to state S1, which triggers
the update function timeout(). If timeout() is called from state
S2 (i.e., count== 2), themost recent event is reset (in the case
of this example, z), and the variable count is decremented.
The temporal condition used for the output of the TCOMB
gate is a variant of the one used in the TAND gate. Therefore
the temporal condition is omitted to avoid redundancy.
F. PROPOSED ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
This subsection introduces the proposed analysis methodol-
ogy. The flow chart of the proposed methodology is shown
in Fig. 10. We start from a system-level specification model,
in which a system is composed of interconnected compo-
nents. This specification model must be provided by the
designer in a general-purpose modeling language, such as
SysML [27]. The failure rate of each component is character-
ized from the system specification. From the SysML model,
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FIGURE 11. Comparison of the estimated unreliability over time of TDFTs and DFTs. (a) TAND vs. AND gate. (b) TPAND vs. PAND gate. (c) TFDEP vs.
FDEP gate.
a fault tree of the system is obtained using an automatic syn-
thesis tool, such as the one proposed in [28]. Subsequently,
a formal PTA model of the system’s FT is obtained through
the parallel composition of the PTA models of the TDFT
gates. These gate models exist in a UPPAAL gate library
(shown asModels lib. in Fig. 10) that can be imported into any
statistical model-checking tool with support to UPPAAL’s
XML format. The next step is to evaluate if the reliability of
the system under analysis is within the acceptable threshold
defined by the specification. This evaluation is performed
in UPPAAL-SMC by using Wald’s sequential hypothesis
testing [29]. This test computes a proportion r among n runs
that satisfy the defined property. Given two possible hypothe-
sis, a and b, the value of rwill eventually cross log(β÷(1−α))
or log((1−β)÷α) with probability 1, where α and β are the
probabilities of accepting hypothesis a or b, respectively [20].
The properties generated for the hypothesis testing and for the
model checking steps are in the form of full weightedMetric
Interval Temporal Logic (MITL) queries. An example of such
query is given below:
Pr[bound;N ](max : expr) (5)
where bound defines the constraint on the number of runs. N
gives the number of runs explicitly, and expr is the expres-
sion to evaluate. It is worth noting that these properties are
analyzed for a certain confidence interval, which controls the
number of iterations processed by the tool. If the probability
of failure in the system is within the allowed threshold, no fur-
ther analysis is conducted. However, if the probability of
failure is above the allowed threshold, the proposed method-
ology moves into the refinement evaluation step. The goal of
this step is to identify if there exists a certain configuration
of the fault tree under analysis that satisfies the evaluated
query. To this end, first, the critical path of the TDFT is
identified (i.e., the sub-tree that has the highest probability
of failure). Then, the leaf gates of the critical path are tested
with different instances of temporal events with different
durations. For example, a gate that has only permanent faults
may be changed so that one or more of its events may become
temporal. Thereafter, these temporal events may be tested
over different duration intervals.This analysis can generate a
very a detailed quantitative report, that has the objective of
showing the system designers of the exact vulnerabilities of
the system, and which parameters have a greater impact to
the system’s criticality.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, the results of the analyses of the failure
probabilities of different fault tree gates and systems with
and without the presence of temporal faults are presented
and discussed. Furthermore, different experiments are pre-
sented, with the purpose of demonstrating a different aspect
of the proposed TDFT methodology. The analyses have been
performed on UPPAAL-SMC version 4.1.19, running on a
machine with an AMD Ryzen 1800X CPU and 32 GB of
RAM.
A. UNRELIABILITY EVALUATION OVER TIME
It is important to illustrate the behavioral difference between
a TDFT gate and a regular FT gate. This experiment eval-
uates the probability of failure of a single TDFT gate due
to temporal faults and the progression of this failure over
time compared with a regular FT gate. Fig. 11 illustrates the
behavior of different TDFT gates and their corresponding
regular gates. The failure rate of all basic events in this
experiment is assumed to be equal to 0.1. Fig. 11(a) shows
the results obtained from the AND gate and from the TAND
gate. Fig. 11(b) shows the unreliability progression of the
PAND and TPANDgates. Finally, Fig. 11(c) shows the results
obtained by computing the unreliability of the FDEP and
TFDEP gates, connected to a regular AND gate through a
trigger relationship. It can be observed that the unreliability
probabilities obtained with the regular FT gates are greatly
overestimated. This happens because, as discussed previ-
ously, basic events that occur in a regular gate are permanent.
However, basic events occurring in a temporal gate may have
a limited duration, in which case a failure is only triggered if
the required events happen during the same time window.
B. SCALABILITY OF THE PROPOSED TDFT ANALYSIS
One of the major weaknesses of regular FTA methods based
on model-checking is the size limitation that is imposed on
the analysis. For example, probabilistic model checking of
FTs over time is very demanding and often cannot be handled
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FIGURE 12. Modular FT analysis of the binary hypercube architecture. (a) Adapted FT from the binary hypercube architecture.
(b) Extended FT of component T1. (c) Extended FT of component T2.
by model-checking tools such as PRISM, MRMC and Storm.
The proposed TDFT method circumvents this limitation in
two distinct ways: 1) As previously mentioned (Fig. 10),
the proposed TDFT analysis takes advantage of a technique
called Statistical Hypothesis Testing (SHT) [29]. SHT is a
method of statistical inference where two statistical data sets
are compared, or a data set obtained by sampling is compared
against a synthetic data set from an idealized model. In other
words, the model may be evaluated against a query (i.e., is the
estimated availability of component x > 0.9 ?). The outcome
of this evaluation is either true or false. This method may be
used to guide the analysis process byminimizing the expected
resource consumption. 2) Unlike most model-checking tech-
niques, the proposed TDFT methodology applies full FT
modularity without the need to partition the original model
into its sub-trees. This can be done by simply editing a
command line, responsible for instantiating the models, in the
UPPAAL system declarations.
The main objective of the second experiment is to demon-
strate the applicability of the proposed approach on large
systems. This experiment is also used to showcase the dis-
crepancy between the results obtained with the proposed
TDFTs against regular probabilistic FTA analysis, in scenar-
ios where temporal faults are considered. The fault trees used
in this experiment can be seen in Fig. 12. Fig. 12(a) shows a
top-level fault tree model that is adapted from the case study
developed in Dugan et al. [30]. Components T1 (Fig. 12(b))
and T2 (Fig. 12(c)) are external events to the top-level FT.
This experiment is conducted in three separate steps. In each
step, two different models of the fault trees are built. The first
model (DFTmodel) uses regular probabilistic FT gates, while
the second model (proposed TDFT model) uses the temporal
gates proposed in this paper. Both FT models are analyzed
separately. In the case of the TDFTmodel, whenever an event
is triggered in a temporal gate, a random choice is made
to determine if the event is permanent or temporal. This is
done to test the scalability of the models, as temporal events
TABLE 1. Estimated availability of component T1 after 100 seconds.
Failure rate of basic events is assumed to be 0.05. Temporal events are
assumed to last up to 3 seconds.
are more complex to be resolved. In the case of the DFT
model, all events are considered permanent upon occurrence.
It is worth mentioning that for the purposes of this paper,
the results of the different iterations of the hypothesis anal-
yses are omitted, for clarity.
The first step in this experiment is the analysis of com-
ponent T1. The extended FT of component T1 is shown
in Fig. 12(b). To illustrate the impact that temporal events
may have in the analysis, this goal of this experiment is to
consider a single temporal gate in the FT and to compute the
impact of that temporal gate on the estimated availability of
the system. Table 1 shows the estimated availability at the
different system components when the events of gates G4,
G7, or G9 are considered temporal. In this experiment, it is
assumed that the failure rate of the basic events (X1 - X8)
is 0.05, the duration of temporal basic events is 3 seconds,
and the estimated availability is computed over a period
of 100 seconds. For example, let us consider the cases where
gates G4 or G7 are temporal. It can be seen in Fig. 12(b)
that gateG4 impacts the results of components X9, X11, X13,
and T1. On the other hand, gate G7 impacts components
X12, X13, and T1. For each case, the results in the table
quantify the impact of these gates on each of the components,
compared to analyses that only consider permanent events.
For example, if we were to classify the system in the terms
of the Five Nines standard [31], and assuming that the input
events of gate G4 are temporal, a regular FTA would classify
this system (availability of T1) as One Nine (1N), whereas
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TABLE 2. Estimated availability of component T2 after 100 seconds.
Failure rate of basic events is assumed to be 0.05. Temporal events are
assumed to last up to 3 seconds.
TABLE 3. Estimated availability of the binary hypercube system after
100 seconds. Temporal events are assumed to last up to 3 seconds.
the TDFT analysis would rightfully classify it as Four Nines
(4N). This means that in this hypothetical scenario, the regu-
lar FTA would greatly underestimate the availability rating
of this system. This, in turn, would mean that the design
team would have to spend more resources than necessary in
order to increase the rating of the system to the Five Nines
(5N) standard (i.e., availability = 0.999995, or the system is
available for 99.999% of the time).
Next, we perform a similar analysis on the extended FT
of component T2, shown in Fig. 12(c). For this experiment,
the assumptions used for component T1 also apply. The
results are presented in Table 2, for the regular and temporal
analyses. A different analysis is performed for each of the
lower-level gates to assess the impact of temporal events on
those gates as well as their impact on the top event. In the
last step of this experiment, we utilize the partial results
in Tables 1 and 2 to analyze the fault tree of the Hypercube
system (in Fig. 12(a)). The failure rates for the basic events
of this fault tree (A - J) are assumed to be equal to the failure
rate of T1.
Table 3 shows an estimation of the availability of the
different components of T1, after 100 seconds. In the table,
Regular FTA shows the results obtained with regular FT
analysis. For comparison and validation, the row DFTCalc
of the table shows the results obtained through FTA using the
DFTCalc tool [11], which is a well-known tool for dynamic
fault tree analysis. In the TDFT analysis rows, we report the
results obtained with the proposed TDFT models, with both
temporal and permanent faults considered. Similarly to the
previous steps of the analysis, each of the lower-level gates
was analyzed individually to evaluate the effect of temporal
events, as well as their impact to the top-level event. The
results shown, for Regular FTA and DFTCalc, demonstrate
a near parity between the values obtained. However, the table
also shows that the presence of even a single source of tem-
poral faults may drastically alter the estimated results of the
analysis. This demonstrates the importance of the proposed
FIGURE 13. Temporal fault tree of the pressure chamber case-study.
methodology in environments where temporal faults may
occur, since this difference cannot be detected with regular
FTA. It is noticeable that the type and location of the temporal
gate may drastically change the results obtained at the TLE.
For example, gate G11 directly impacts the outcome of gates
G12, G14 and G16. In other words, increasing or decreasing
the availability rating associated to gateG11 has direct effects
on the outputs of all other gates that G11 is connected to.
Therefore, as seen in Table 3, the effects of a single gate may
ripple through the FT generating significant differences in the
estimated results.
C. COMPARISON BETWEEN TDFTs AND TEMPORAL
FAULT TREES (TFTs)
As previously discussed in Section II, other techniques have
tried to integrate temporal constraints to fault tree analysis.
One of the most expressive techniques in the literature is the
Temporal Fault Trees (TFTs) formalism, introduced in [32].
The analysis in [32] assigns time constraints to the propaga-
tion of the bottom events of the tree. The examples of such
time constraints, shown in Fig. 13, are Forpast and Within.
Forpast indicates that the event must be active for a minimum
amount of time before propagating (e.g., Forpast 3 indicates
that the bottom event must be active for 3 units of time before
propagating in the system). Similarly, Within indicates that
the bottom event must occur within a certain time-frame
(e.g, Within 3 signifies that the event must happen before
3 time units have passed, in order to propagate in the system).
In this subsection, we present a direct comparison between
the TDFT and TFT techniques, by adapting the Pressure
Chamber fault tree (Fig. 13) from [32] and comparing the
obtained results. The system depicted in the figure shows a
series of events and conditions that may lead to an explosion
in the system. Starting from the bottom-most events, the
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TABLE 4. Estimated reliability of the pressure chamber system after
100 seconds. (Fault=X in the table refers to the time duration of the fault,
with X being units of time.)
failure of the pressure sensor for over 3 units of time together
with the absence of an open valve command within the same
3 time units, generates an error where the computer was
supposed to open the pressure valve but fails to do so (gate
G1). Alternatively, the system may experience a valve sensor
failure, which, if it lasts more than 3 time units, generates a
valve failure. If the valve fails or if the computer fails to open
the valve, an error is generated, since the valve did not open
to release the building pressure (gate G2). If the valve cannot
be opened and the system experiences high pressure in the
chamber for over 3 time units, an explosion occurs (gateG3).
For the TDFT analysis, the conditions Forpast and Within
have beenmodeled with leafTOR gates, where the conditions
Forpast and Within are enforced by adjusting the guards of
the output transition of the TOR gate. Gates G1, G2 and
G3 are regular TDFT gates. The comparison of the results
of the TFT analysis with the proposed TDFT analysis are
presented in Table 4. From the table, it can be seen that while
the TFT technique is definitely an improvement over regular
FTA, the results obtained by the former are rather limited.
In the example (Fig. 13), the expected duration of the fault
events is 3 seconds. Therefore, if the duration of the faults
is less than 3 seconds, the probability of failure is equal to
zero. Furthermore, if the duration of the faults is equal or
greater than 3 seconds, the probability of failure is always
the same. Based on this fact. The table shows that unlike
other approaches, the results provided by the TDFT analysis
can provide a distinct estimation for each considered fault
duration.
D. FAILURE ESTIMATION OF THE SPARC
V8 ARCHITECTURE WITH TDFTs
Having established the differences between the proposed
TDFT analysis and the regular probabilistic FTA in the pre-
vious experiments, the final experiment demonstrates the
importance of the proposed approach to fault analysis. This
is done by analyzing the fault tree of the integer pipeline
of the Leon-3 processor and comparing the obtained results
to radiation testing and simulation. In order to obtain the
FT of the Leon-3 integer pipeline, we have adopted an ana-
lytical approach for the generation of fault trees for com-
plex systems, known as the Behaviour-Based Method [33].
This approach considers faults as behaviours, and fault-tree
gates as operations on those behaviours. By applying this
technique to the Leon-3 7-stage pipeline, and based on the
FIGURE 14. DFT of the 7-stage integer pipeline of the
SPARC-V8 architecture.
structural information available in the SPARC V8 architecture
manual [34], [35], the fault tree of the integer pipeline is
constructed, as shown in Fig. 14. The fault tree is divided
into 7 levels, each representing a stage of the pipeline. For
this experiment, the probabilities used for the failure rates in
the model are derived from the cross-section values reported
in [15].
The goals of this experiment are first to determine the prob-
ability of a crash error in the processor pipeline, which raises a
trap exception. Secondly, to determine the probability of each
type of trap error generated over a period of time. To this end,
the probabilities of soft-error events utilized in our model are
derived from the cross-section values obtained through the
radiation bombardment of a LEON3 design conducted and
published in [15]. Furthermore, the work in [15] also contains
a fault-injection simulation experiment. These results have
been used in this paper for set-up and validation purposes.
In this analysis, the proposed FT model has been eval-
uated through over 3800 iterations, reaching a confidence
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FIGURE 15. Probability of trap exceptions in different approaches.
Simulation and radiation test results are reproduced from [15].
level of 95%. The confidence level can be further increased
if more iterations are considered. Each iteration computes
the estimated probability of system failure, assuming multi-
ple soft-errors may happen at any given time. Through our
results, we estimate that approximately 41% of all errors
originating from soft-faults were captured as trap exceptions.
Based on the modeled fault tree, and following the function-
ality described in the SPARC-V8 manual [34], the proposed
model is able to estimate the probability of occurrence of the
following types of trap exceptions in the SPARC-V8 pipeline:
• instruction_access_exception:A blocking error excep-
tion causes the instruction to be unavailable.
• data_store_error: An error exception that occurs dur-
ing a data store to memory.
• illegal_instruction: An attempt to execute an instruc-
tion with an invalid opcode.
• data_access_exception: An error exception that occurs
on a load/store data access.
• mem_address_not_aligned: A load/store operation
that generates an improper memory address, according
to the instruction.
• Others: All other types of trap exceptions.
Out of the 41% of soft-faults captured as trap exceptions,
Fig. 15 shows the probability of each exception type to
occur. In order to validate the proposed model, we have
compared the obtained probabilities (Proposed FTA) to the
ones reported in [15] (Radiation Test and Simulation). It can
be seen that the values obtained with the proposed FTA are
consistent with the values of the radiation test.
The proposed analysis can also be used to assess other
metrics, such as the estimated time before a failure, the failure
rate over time, and the impact of soft-errors on different
components to the vulnerability of the system. Table 5 shows
an estimation of the probability of trap exceptions over time,
the probability of detected errors over time, and the probabil-
ity of undetected errors over time. Although relatively small,
the probability of undetected errors in the system may repre-
sent a serious issue in certain conditions, where the system is
TABLE 5. SPARC-V8 probability of failure over time.
expected to operate without maintenance. Our analysis shows
that the biggest contributors to the occurrence of undetected
errors are the nPC register (22.5 % of cases), the rfa register
(19.7 % of cases), and the d_cache (17.3 % of cases).
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a new modeling and analysis approach
to accurately compute the availability of systems exposed
to temporal faults. Regular probabilistic fault tree models
calculate the probability of failure under the assumption that
every fault is permanent. However, in the real world, sources
of interference (such as heat and radiation) can be intermit-
tent. Therefore, their impact on the behavior of digital cir-
cuits (especially self-repair systems) may be only temporary.
TDFTs are introduced to capture such phenomena, providing
an unprecedented level of precision and customization to fault
tree analysis of soft-faults. The results presented in this paper
illustrate the versatility of the proposed methodology and the
level of accuracy obtained in comparison with other FTA
approaches. Future work includes the further extension of
TDFT gates in order to analyze latent faults and rare events
in systems affected by temporal faults.
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